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Abstract
Under what conditions will women’s presence in elective office promote woman-friendly policies? The
research outlined here will examine this question through a comparison of six Sub-Saharan African
democracies (Benin, Botswana, Lesotho, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania). Women have been elected into
sub-Saharan African parliaments in record numbers, but is this leading to increased substantive
representation, or the enactment of policies that focus on benefitting women? Following a Most Similar
Systems design, this research develops an original composite scale to measure woman-friendly policy and
finds that there is no clear relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. The remainder of
the analysis seeks to identify the factors that lead to the breakdown between women’s presence and
womanfriendly policy. While no relationship between descriptive and substantive representation exists,
different institutional and cultural perspectives influence woman-friendly policy in this region.
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Are Women Winning? Does Descriptive Representation of Women in Parliament 
Lead to Woman-Friendly Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
Molly Willeford 
 
Abstract: Under what conditions will women’s presence in elective office promote 
woman-friendly policies? The research outlined here will examine this question through 
a comparison of six Sub-Saharan African democracies (Benin, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania). Women have been elected into sub-Saharan 
African parliaments in record numbers, but is this leading to increased substantive 
representation, or the enactment of policies that focus on benefitting women? Following 
a Most Similar Systems design, this research develops an original composite scale to 
measure woman-friendly policy and finds that there is no clear relationship between 
descriptive and substantive representation. The remainder of the analysis seeks to 
identify the factors that lead to the breakdown between women’s presence and woman-
friendly policy. While no relationship between descriptive and substantive representation 
exists, different institutional and cultural perspectives influence woman-friendly policy in 
this region. 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, women have been elected as Members of Parliament (MPs) in 
dramatically increasing numbers. Of the top ten nations in the world for gender parity in 
parliaments, four are Sub-Saharan African nations (IPU 2015). In fact, in 2008, Rwanda 
became the first country in the world to have more women than men in its lower chamber 
of parliament (Barnes and Burchard 2013). Yet, in that same country, 56% of women 
reported experiencing some kind of gender-based violence in 2014 (SIGI 2014). The 
region remains one of the worst in the world for gender-based violence: 40% of women 
living in Sub-Saharan Africa report that they have been victims of gender-based violence, 
and 54% believe that domestic abuse is an acceptable practice (SIGI 2014). The Social 
Institutions and Gender Index 2014 report states that “seven countries have no laws on 
rape, 17 have no laws on domestic violence, and 11 have no laws on sexual harassment” 
(SIGI 2014). As of last year, the region also reported high levels of discrimination 
regarding socio-economic rights; 18% of women living in the region do not have access 
to land titles, and discrimination in inheritance titles persists in 12 countries, making it 
difficult for women to have control over land and assets (SIGI 2014).  
This raises several inter-related questions: under what conditions does women’s 
presence in elected office lead to woman-friendly policy? Specifically, do women elected 
to national parliaments in Sub-Saharan Africa work to pass legislation surrounding 
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violence against women? One of the main arguments regarding increased descriptive 
representation (presence in elected office) is that it will lead to substantive policies that 
benefit and are of concern  to women (Bauer 2012; Stockemer 2011; Conner 2009; Krook 
2009; Bauer 2008; Bauer & Britton 2006). Do sub-Saharan African countries with higher 
levels of female legislative representation have less discriminatory policies than sub-
Saharan African countries with lower levels of female descriptive representation? If not, 
then what may help to explain why presence does not result in concrete policy or status 
improvements for women? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 There is much debate on the link between women’s descriptive representation and 
substantive representation. Many believe that women involved in parliaments will bring 
increased attention to women’s interests and, therefore will bring about more woman-
friendly policies (Barnes & Burchard 2013; Stockemer 2011; Tripp & Kang 2008). 
However, much of the literature suggests that no clear link exists between increased 
numbers in parliaments and woman-friendly policy being passed in the legislatures 
(Bauer & Burnet 2013; Conner 2008; Waylen 2008; Bauer 2008). If electing more 
women to parliament does not produce positive policy outcomes in areas like domestic 
abuse and rape, then what explains that discrepancy? The literature suggests that other 
kinds of institutional and cultural factors may promote or inhibit woman-friendly policy 
making.  
Arguably, democracies are the better type of government for achieving 
substantive representation. Women are more likely to have their positions heard in a 
democracy as opposed to an authoritarian regime (Bauer 2012; Stockemer 2011; Tripp & 
Kang 2008; Yoon 2004). Legislators in authoritarian regimes may not have much policy-
making power, due to power being vested elsewhere, in the executive (Stockemer 2011). 
Newer democratic constitutions, on the contrary, often play a role in shaping progressive 
policy regarding women, reflecting the “changing of times” (Bauer 2012).  
Gender quotas have become a common solution for the problem of low 
descriptive representation of women, but while a gender quota may increase women’s 
presence in the halls of power, that does not necessarily lead to improved policy sway 
(Bauer 2012; Bauer 2008; Conner 2008). This can often happen when a government 
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adopts reserved seats or legislated party quotas (Adams 2011; Conner 2008; Tripp & 
Kang 2008).  
Research suggests that voluntary party quotas empower women and reduce 
tokenism, the idea that only a symbolic effort is being made like recruiting more women 
into political office. Often, the push for an adoption of gender quotas comes through 
pressure from international organizations or governments to increase female 
representation (Barnes & Burchard 2013; Waylen 2008). In 1995, a Conference on 
Women in Beijing, hosted by the UN, made a call for gender parity in bodies of 
government by the year 2015 (Krook 2009). This was made in hopes of not only 
including more women in political decision-making bodies, but to hopefully see more 
woman-friendly policy being passed in countries where women are marginalized, like 
sub-Saharan Africa (Amoateng, et al 2014).  
Adoption of voluntary quotas, however, probably relies on some level of cultural 
support for gender equality. One of the most influential cultural factors is religion (Norris 
& Inglehart 2001). Studies have found that Catholic countries adhere to more hierarchal 
and authoritarian cultural values (Norris & Inglehart 2001). However, even more studies 
have shown that Catholicism does not matter – if a country is Catholic or Protestant, or 
even predominantly Christian, they will have more women friendly policies and practices 
than states with other religious practices (Norris & Inglehart 2001).  Countries that tend 
to practice indigenous religions will have a harder time accepting pro-woman policies. 
Catholic, Islamic, and indigenous religions doctrines take a more traditional view of 
women’s roles in society, encouraging larger families, and restrict women’s bodily 
autonomy, placing women in subordinate positions to men in society, economy, and 
family. In such societies, which may often be agrarian, it is less likely to find societal 
support (or demand) for woman-friendly policies, such as laws against rape or child 
marriage laws. It will also be likely for traditional societies to adopt voluntary gender 
quotas that promote women’s presence in policy-effective ways. 
The literature reviewed here suggests the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Sub-Saharan African countries with higher numbers of 
women in parliaments will pass more woman-friendly policies. 
Hypothesis 2: Favoring institutional factors will contribute to more 
woman-friendly policies in place. 
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Hypothesis 2a: Voluntary political party quotas will lead to more woman-
friendly policies. 
Hypothesis 2b: Proportional representation voting systems will favor more 
woman-friendly policies.  
Hypothesis 3: Favoring cultural factors, like religions and birth rates, will 
contribute to more woman-friendly policies. 
Hypothesis 3a: Countries that are Christian will favor more woman-
friendly policies. 
Hypothesis 3b: Countries with lower fertility rates will favor more 
woman-friendly policies. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 
 The current research employs a small-N comparative cases design involving six 
sub-Saharan African democracies that vary substantially in terms of the main hypothesis 
variable: women’s descriptive representation. The cases are all considered free 
democracies by the Freedom House 2015 report (scoring 1 to 3). See Table 1. Twelve 
sub-Saharan African countries meet that criterion. From those, six were selected for their 
variation on the main hypothesis variable, women’s share of the lower or only house in 
the legislature. Female representation in the sample ranges from a low of 7.2% in Benin 
to a high of 42.7% in Senegal. If Hypothesis 1 is valid, then Benin should have the least 
woman-friendly policies and Senegal should have much stronger legal protections of 
women’s bodily safety and autonomy. 
Dependent Variable Measure 
 Woman-friendly policy, as defined in the literature review, can be an all-
encompassing term. The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI 2014) database 
created a score for 160 countries around the world, measuring policy relating to women’s 
rights. The index measures the legality of discriminatory family codes; restricted physical 
integrity; son bias; restricted resources and assets; and restricted civil liberties (SIGI 
2014). For the purposes of this study, only the subcategories of discriminatory family 
codes, restricted physical integrity, and restricted civil liberties will be examined.  
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Table 1: Case Selection 
Country: 
Freedom 
House Score: 
Percentage 
(from IPU): 
Benin 2 7.2% 
Botswana 2.5 9.5% 
Lesotho 2.5 25% 
Tanzania 3 36% 
S. Africa 2 41.9% 
Senegal 2 42.7% 
 
Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union’s (IPU) “Women in National Parliaments” database from September 2015. 
 The database measures the legal framework from 0, meaning the law guarantees 
this right, to 1, meaning there are no laws in place at this time for this right. So if a 
country has a 0 for laws addressing domestic abuse, this country would have adequate 
laws in place and would have no problems with the implementation of said law (SIGI 
2014). However, if a country were to have a score of 1, then there would be no adequate 
laws in place addressing domestic abuse in this country. While this score is an accurate 
measure of laws in each country, the coding for this research has been flipped to produce 
more intuitive findings. A score of 1 means that there are adequate laws in place and no 
problems of implementation, and 0 means no laws are in place. A weight of 0.50 was 
given to laws addressing domestic violence, rape, and sexual harassment, because those 
issues are of obvious urgency for women. Table 2 shows how each of the composite 
scores were assigned to each case, given the SIGI Index score of legislation in place to 
address issues of legal ages of marriage, parental authority in divorce, domestic violence, 
rape, sexual harassment, and access to public spaces. The numbers were added together 
and weighted to produce the scores shown in Table 2. The values range from least 
friendly (Tanzania, 4.25) to most friendly (South Africa, 7.5). 
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Table 2: Dependent Variable Composition 
 Tanzania Senegal Botswana Lesotho Benin S. Africa 
Legal Age of 
Marriage 
0 0.25 0.5 0.5 1 1 
Parental 
Authority in 
Divorce 
0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 
Inheritance 
Rights for 
Daughters 
0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
Laws 
Addressing 
Domestic 
Violence 
1 1 1.25 0 1.25 1.25 
Laws 
Addressing 
Rape 
1.25 1 1 1.25 1 1.25 
Laws 
Addressing 
Sexual 
Harassment  
1 1.25 1 1 1.25 1 
Access to 
Public Space 
0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 1 
TOTALS 4.5 5 5.25 5.25 6.5 7.5 
Source: Social Institution and Gender Index (SIGI) Data from 2014. 
Independent Variables 
Independent variable measures come from a range of standard data sources. Years 
of independence were obtained from the Country Profiles from the CIA World Factbook. 
Gender Gap Index scores were taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender 
Gap report from 2014. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presence was 
taken from their About Africa page. Gender Inequality Index scores and Human 
Development Index ranks were obtained through the Human Development reports issued 
by the UNDP.  Gross Domestic Product purchasing power parity (GDP PPP) per capita 
was gathered through the World Bank’s GDP per capita PPP measure. Fragile States 
Index rankings were gathered from the Fund For Peace’s Fragile States Index report from 
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2015. The years that constitutions were enacted were found from the Country Profiles 
from the CIA World Factbook. Voting systems information was acquired from the 
Parline Database from the IPU. Information about different quotas was retrieved from the 
Quota Project’s Global Database of Quotas for Women, part of the IPU’s research. 
Majority religious beliefs were also taken from the CIA World Factbook. Fertility rates 
were taken from the World Bank’s fertility rates totals. 
ANALYSIS 
Hypothesis 1 posits that there will be a positive relationship between descriptive 
and substantive representation of women. Table 3 shows the final composite scores for 
each of the cases in comparison to their percentages of women in parliament. South 
Africa scores the highest on the dependent variable scale, with the second highest 
percentage of women of the countries examined. Tanzania, however, scores the lowest, 
even with the third highest percentage of women in parliament. Indeed, there appears to 
be no clear covariation between the main hypotheses variable and the dependent variable. 
The overall hypothesis that higher descriptive representation will lead to more 
substantive representation is not upheld based on the results in Table 3. What, then, can 
explain the variation in woman-friendly policy in the sample? 
Table 3: Descriptive Representation and Substantive Representation 
Country: Tanzania Senegal Botswana Lesotho Benin S. Africa 
Percent: 36% 
(medium) 
42.7% 
(high) 
9.5% 
(low) 
25% 
(medium) 
7.2% 
(low) 
41.9% 
(high) 
Composite 
Score: 
4.5 5 5.25 5.25 6.5 7.5 
 
In a Most Similar Systems Design, cases are compared by controlling variables to 
account for the variance with the dependent variable, woman-friendly policy. By 
controlling for these similar variables, the potential independent variable, or variables, 
causing the variance will emerge. Why is Benin outscoring four other countries? Why is 
Tanzania with women constituting 36% of  its legislature so unfriendly to women in the 
policy arena? Table 4 allows us to eliminate several possible answers and hone in on the 
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factors that can explain the disconnect between women’s legislative presence and 
woman-friendly policy on the most basic women’s issue: bodily autonomy. 
In broad terms, all of the countries in the sample are post-colonial, with a UNDP 
presence, and substantial gender gaps. Those similarities cannot explain the wide 
dispersion on the dependent variable. With the exception of South Africa and Botswana, 
all of the cases have low HDI rankings, low GDP per capita, high state fragility, and 
sharp gender inequality. In South Africa, relative strength in those areas seems to 
correlate with better outcomes as one would expect; but that is not the case in Botswana. 
This leaves a set of institutional and cultural variables summarized in Table 5. 
Which of these variables can account for the variance in woman-friendly policy 
across six cases? To begin, the year of the latest constitutional amendment seems to 
correspond to the score for policy received. At the Beijing Conference, mentioned earlier, 
countries around the globe were called upon to increase the numbers of women in the 
parliaments. As past literature suggests, one of the fastest ways to increase women in 
parliaments is through the adoption of quotas (Krook 2009; Tripp & Kang 2008). After 
the call for more women was made by the UN, most constitutions after 1995 include 
some provision for the inclusion of more women. With the exception of Senegal, those 
cases with their latest constitutions amended or adjusted in the 1990s typically scored 
higher on the woman-friendly policy scale. Tanzania has the second oldest constitution 
and it has the lowest score for woman-friendly policy. Senegal, on the other hand, is the 
exception: with a constitution last amended in 2001, it reports high numbers of women in 
parliament, potentially as a direct result from the 1995 UN Conference, and yet it scored 
low on the policy composite scale. 
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Table 4: Sub-Saharan African Cases 
 Tanzania Senegal Botswana Lesotho Benin S. Africa 
Year of 
Independence 
1964 1960 1966 1966 1960 1961 
Gender Gap Index 0.718 0.691 0.713 0.725 --- 0.753 
UNDP Presence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Gender Inequality 
Index 
0.533 0.537 0.486 0.557 0.614 0.461 
HDI Rank Low Low Medium Low Low Medium 
GDP (PPP) per 
capita 
$1,656 $2,174 $14,454 $2,390 $1,643 $12,042 
Fragile States 
Index 
High 
Warning 
High 
Warning 
Low 
Warning 
Warning Warning Low Warning 
Latest Constitution 1977 2001 1966 1993 1990 1997 
Voting System Majority Mixed Majority Mixed Proportional Proportional 
Quotas Reserved 
Seats 
LCQ VPPQ LCQ none VPPQ 
Majority Religious 
Beliefs 
Muslim & 
Indigenous 
beliefs 
Muslim Christian Christian Catholic Christian 
Percent Economy 
by sector 
Ag - 31.5% 
Ind - 25% 
S - 43.5% 
Ag - 15.8% 
Ind - 23.5% 
S - 60.7% 
Ag - 2.4% 
Ind - 39.2% 
S - 58.4% 
Ag - 5.4% 
Ind - 31.9% 
S - 68.1% 
Ag - 23.5% 
Ind - 23.2% 
S - 53.4% 
Ag - 2.5% 
Ind - 29.5% 
S - 68% 
Fertility Rates 5.2 4.9 2.6 3.0 4.8 2.4 
IPU Percent 36% 42.7% 935% 25% 7.2% 41.9% 
Composite Score 4.25 5 5.25 5.25 6.5 7.5 
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Importantly, Tanzania and South Africa, the low and high poles on woman-
friendly policy, appear to be polar opposites for every institutional and cultural variable. 
Institutionally, quotas voting systems, the literature suggests that the most effective way 
to including more women in parliaments is through proportional representation (PR) list 
electoral system: this system allows more women to enter parliament and gain positions 
of influence (Adams 2011; Yoon 2004). South Africa’s voting system is a PR list system, 
allowing for the party to include more women on these lists for each political party 
(Bauer & Britton 2006). In direct contrast, Tanzania operates in a majoritarian electoral 
system, which some regard as the unfriendly “opposite” of the PR list system. 
Table 5: Institutional and Cultural Differences 
 Tanzania Senegal Botswana Lesotho Benin S. Africa 
Latest Constitution 1977 2001 1966 1993 1990 1997 
Voting System Majority Mixed Majority Mixed Proportional Proportional 
Quotas Reserved 
Seats 
LCQ VPPQ LCQ none VPPQ 
Majority Religious 
Beliefs 
Muslim & 
Indigenous 
beliefs 
Muslim Christian Christian Catholic Christian 
Percent Economy 
by sector 
Ag - 31.5% 
Ind - 25% 
S - 43.5% 
Ag - 15.8% 
Ind - 23.5% 
S - 60.7% 
Ag - 2.4% 
Ind - 39.2% 
S - 58.4% 
Ag - 5.4% 
Ind - 31.9% 
S - 68.1% 
Ag - 23.5% 
Ind - 23.2% 
S - 53.4% 
Ag - 2.5% 
Ind - 29.5% 
S - 68% 
Fertility Rates 5.2 4.9 2.6 3.0 4.8 2.4 
IPU Percent 36% 42.7% 935% 25% 7.2% 41.9% 
Composite Score 4.25 5 5.25 5.25 6.5 7.5 
 
As Tanzania votes within a majoritarian system, it is not always proportionate to 
the way citizens cast their votes. Elections in this system are typically more localized 
than PR elections, meaning they have smaller constituencies as well (Electoral Reform 
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Society 2010). With this kind of voting system, typically there is either a single party 
running for office or a two-party group. This limited number of parties does not allow for 
the full range of potential female candidates, as the PR system does. The number of 
women elected into office is directly related to the voting system within a given, and 
getting women into elected office is half of the battle of implementing woman-friendly 
policy. A woman-friendly voting system, like the PR list system, makes it easier for 
women to gain access into parliaments. Tanzania’s majoritarian system could account for 
the drastically low woman-friendly policy score. 
Going hand-in-hand with voting system, the types of quotas, if any, can be 
another significant factor for determining woman-friendly policies. Once again, Tanzania 
and South Africa appear to be on the opposite ends of the spectrum. South Africa has a 
voluntary political party quota in place. This ensures that some kind of percentage of 
women is given seats – these quotas are different than legislated quotas in the sense that 
political parties voluntarily adopt these quotas. In South Africa, paired with a PR voting 
system, these kinds of quotas govern where each candidate is positioned on the list. 
Voluntary quotas usually have women making up anywhere between 25 to 50 percent of 
the list (Krook 2009). South Africa’s majority party, the African National Congress 
(ANC) is the only political party in the country with a quota provision in place – 50 
percent of the seats won in any election, local or national, must go to women legislators 
(Quota Project 2015). Because the ANC has voluntarily established these quota 
provisions, it shows that the party wants more women involved. When a party and a 
system is friendly to women, it is likely that more will be done for women’s interests as a 
whole. 
Tanzania does have a kind of quota in place called reserved seats. These seats are 
guaranteed to go to women; they are different than a legislated or voluntary party in the 
fact that while 50 percent of the seats won will go to women, with reserved seats a 
predetermined number of seats in parliament will go to women no matter what (Quota 
Project 2015). While this method is great for ensuring that more women are involved in 
parliament, it does run the risk of becoming purely symbolic, leading to the problem of 
tokenism (Krook 2009; Conner 2008; Tripp & Kang 2008). This is what may be 
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happening in Tanzania; women are being represented at a higher rate, but they have little 
to show for it in terms of woman-friendly policy in the country. 
Cultural factors also play a huge role in determining the reach of woman-friendly 
policies in a country, as Hypothesis 3 implies. These factors can range  from the major 
religious beliefs of a state to fertility rates. Religion is a common theme through sub-
Saharan Africa. It is hard to say whether or not religions can be “opposite” of one 
another, but again to contrast the highest scoring and lowest scoring cases, South Africa 
and Tanzania, looking at each case’s major religious beliefs have shed some light on 
these differences. 
Hypothesis 3a regarding religion can be accepted. The major religious belief of 
Tanzania is that of the Islamic faith. The Western world holds a stereotype that the 
Islamic faith is one that is not favorable towards women. While in some cases this may 
be true, religion is a difficult area since most religions are not  “one-size-fits-all” – 
meaning that one version of Islam does not necessarily apply to all parts of the Islamic 
world. With Tanzania, however, another major religious belief is those indigenous 
beliefs, or the beliefs of the local tribes in the country. The numerous indigenous tribes in 
this country and perhaps in many of the other cases mentioned, may hold patriarchal 
beliefs that prohibit women from holding positions of power. While the region of sub-
Saharan Africa is very vast and diverse, it is nearly impossible to generalize the 
experiences of one country to many different countries around the region. There are many 
Islamic countries in the region, including another case in this study, Senegal. Yet 
Tanzania and Senegal scored differently on the scale and have differences in the variables 
as well.  
Fertility rates too should be noted for their variance. Hypothesis 3b can be 
accepted; lower fertility rates will amount for more woman-friendly policy. South Africa 
has a much lower fertility rate than the other cases in the study. Tanzania has the highest 
fertility rate of the cases and scored the worst on the composite measure of the dependent 
variable. When a society favors more children per woman, it seems to lack policy in 
place to help these women and their families.  Overall, Hypothesis 3 and 3b could be 
accepted based on the research. Hypothesis 3a could be partially accepted, with the 
exception of Benin. 
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CONCLUSION 
“Representation is a necessary condition for policy effectiveness, but it is not a 
sufficient condition by any means” (Hassim 2006). This quote from the book Women in 
African Parliaments rings true in the case of this study. While no relationship was found 
connecting women’s descriptive representation and substantive representation of woman-
friendly policy, there are other instances worth exploring. Strong correlations involving 
voting systems and quotas imply that these systems are influential on the kinds of policy 
made regarding women. Institutional and cultural circumstances should be explored in all 
cases, and perhaps throughout the region to find connections and correlations. However, 
as sub-Saharan Africa is such a diverse region itself, this may prove difficult as each 
country may vary. Another possible factor to consider is adherence to implicit tribal laws: 
are there tribal laws being followed, exempted from governing bodies? Could other 
factors besides those cultural and institutional ones mentioned be playing into a surplus 
or lack of policy?  
An in-depth case study examining both Tanzania and South Africa should be 
strived for in future studies. Cultural and institutional factors should be examined closely. 
While women in parliaments is an important way to include more woman-friendly policy, 
it is not the only factor involved in the process of including more legislation regarding 
women.  
Inglehart and Norris remark, “Moving further toward achieving equality for 
women… remains one of the most important challenges facing governments in the 
twenty-first century.” This is especially true in sub-Saharan Africa. When women are 
equal in terms of the law, a country can greatly benefit. Marginalizing and excluding 
women from policies and politics can have disastrous consequences for a country’s 
progress.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RES PUBLICA XXI  	  
 
47 	  
REFERENCES 
 
Adams, Kimberly S. 2011. “Rounding The Tables of Legislative Decision Making: 
Explanations for the Increased Presence of Women in Sub-Saharan African 
Politics.” International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities and 
Nations 11(2): 45–65.  
Amoateng, Acheampong Yaw, Tim B Heaton, and Ishmael Kalule-Sabiti. 2014. “Gender 
And Changing Patterns of Politics Participation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Evidence 
from Five Waves of the Afrobarometer Surveys.” Gender & Behaviour 12(3): 
5897–5910.  
Barnes, Tiffany D. & Stephanie M. Burchard. 2013. “’Engendering’ Politics: The Impact 
of Descriptive Representation on Women’s Political Engagement in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” Comparative Political Studies (July): 767-790.  
Bauer, Gretchen. 2012. “’Let There be a Balance’: Women in African Parliaments.” 
Political Studies Review (Sept): 370-384. Bauer, Gretchen. 2008. “Fifty/Fifty by 
2020: Electoral Gender Quotas for Parliament in East and Southern Africa.” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 10(3): 348–68.  
Bauer, Gretchen & Hannah E. Britton. 2006. “Women in African Parliaments: A 
Continental Shift?” In Gretchen Bauer & Hannah E. Britton (Eds.) Women in 
African Parliaments 
Bauer, Gretchen, and Jennie E Burnet. 2013. “Gender Quotas, Democracy, and Women's  
Representation in Africa: Some Insights from Democratic Botswana and 
AutocraticRwanda.” Women's Studies International Forum 41: 103–12.  
Central Intelligence Agency. 2013. “World Factbook.” 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ [Accessed Oct. 21, 
2015] 
Conner, Bethany. 2009. “’You Made a Mistake – You Selected a Woman!”: The 
Implementation  of Political Gender Quotas in Postconflict African Nations.” 
Tulane Journal of International & Comparative Law (Nov): 203-224. 
Freedom House. 2015. “Freedom in the World 2015.”  Available from 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015 [Accessed 
Aug. 27,2015] 
 RES PUBLICA XXI 
 
 
48 
 
Freedom House. 2015. “Sub-Saharan Africa.” Available from 
https://freedomhouse.org/regions/sub-saharan-africa [Access Aug. 27, 2015] 
Hassim, Shireen. 2006. “The Virtuous Circle of Representation: Women in African 
Parliaments.” In Women in African Parliaments, eds. Gretchen Bauer and Hannah 
E. Britton. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Inglehart, Ronald & Norris, Pippa. 2003. Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural 
Change Around the World. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU). 2015. “Women in national parliaments.” Available 
from http://ipu.org/wmn-e/arc/classif010915.htm [Accessed Aug. 27, 2015]. 
Krook, Mona Lena. 2009. Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate 
Selection Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Norris, Pippa & Inglehart, Ronald. 2001. “Cultural Obstacles to Equal Representation.” 
Journal of Democracy, (3), 126. 
Quota Project. 2015. “Country Overview.” International IDEA, Stockhom University, and 
Inter-Parliamentary Union. Available from 
http://www.quotaproject.org/country.cfm [Accessed on Oct. 28, 2015]. 
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). 2014. “Gender Equality and Social 
Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa - Country Profiles.”  Organisation for 
Economic Co-Operation and Development. Available from 
http://www.genderindex.org/countries/Sub-Saharan%20Africa [Accessed on Oct. 
14, 2015]. 
Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI). 2014. “Sub-Saharan Africa.” Organisation 
for  Economic Co-Operation and Development. Available from 
http://www.genderindex.org/content/sub-saharan-africa [Accessed on Oct. 14, 
2015]. 
Stockemer, Daniel. 2011. “Women’s Parliamentary Representation in Africa: The Impact 
of Democracy and Corruption on the Number of Female Deputies in National 
Parliaments.” Political Studies (July): 693-712.  
Tripp, Aili Mari & Alice Kang. 2008. “The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track 
to Increased Female Legislative Representation.” Comparative Political Studies 
(Mar): 338- 361.  
RES PUBLICA XXI  	  
 
49 	  
United Nations Development Programme. 2015. Overview. Available from 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/overview.html [Accessed on 
Oct. 14, 2015]. 
 “Voting Systems Made Simple.” 2010. Electoral Reform Society. http://www.electoral-
reform.org.uk/voting-systems. [Accessed on Oct. 15, 2015]. 
Waylen, Georgina. 2008. “Enhancing the Substantive Representation of Women: Lessons 
fromTransitions to Democracy.” Parliamentary Affairs (Mar): 518-534. 
World Bank. 2013. Fertility rates, totals. Available from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN [Accessed on Nov. 11, 
2015].  
World Bank. GDP per capita, PPP. Available from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD [Accessed on Nov. 
11, 2015]. 
Yoon, Mi Yung. 2004. “Explaining Women's Legislative Representation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 29(3): 447–68. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
